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I.  Introduction 
In 1996, seventeen year-old Wendy Whitaker was charged and 
convicted of sodomy, a crime that required her to register as a sexual 
offender for life according to Georgia’s rules at the time.1  The crime she 
committed?  Performing consensual oral sex on a fifteen year-old male 
classmate.2  In 2005, seventeen year-old Genarlow Wilson was charged and 
convicted of aggravated child molestation, a crime with a minimum 
mandatory sentence of ten years imprisonment under Georgia’s state law at 
the time.3  His crime?  Engaging in consensual oral sex with a fifteen year-
old girl, just shy of Georgia’s age of consent.4 
Cases like those of Genarlow Wilson and Wendy Whitaker raise 
questions of privacy, consensuality, and agency among young people.  
However, aside from a few exceptions, these are not the cases that one 
often sees reported on television or in the newspaper.  Instead one is more 
likely to see reports of sexual relationships between a teacher and student, a 
stepfather and stepdaughter, or a priest and a young altar boy.5  Those are 
the types of cases legislatures usually seek to punish when creating sexual 
offense laws—not cases of normal teenage sexual experimentation or 
behavior.6 
In 2006, the Georgia legislature enacted what was referred to as “the 
nation’s broadest and most restrictive law regarding sex offender 
registration and residential restrictions for registered sex offenders.”7  The 
law, House Bill 1059 (“HB 1059”),8 adopted age-based exceptions to the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders 
from the State of Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 
518 (2007) (noting that “[t]here are still others on Georgia’s sex offender registry who are 
not predators by any stretch of the imagination”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Brenda Goodman, Georgia Court Frees Man Convicted in Sex Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/27/us/27georgia.html (reporting on 
the early release of Genarlow Wilson—sentenced at seventeen years old to ten years in 
prison for consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old girl—by the Georgia Supreme Court). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 57 (2004) (evaluating common prosecutions reported in the media regarding 
relationships with large age gaps and/or an abuse of authority). 
 6. See Goodman, supra note 3. 
 7. Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of 
Sex Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 539 (2007) (providing 
an overview of the impact residency restrictions have on offenders). 
 8. See H.B. 1059, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) available at 
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state’s strict sexual offender and registry laws which lessened the 
punishment for those who fell within those exceptions.  It was established, 
largely, in reaction to the public outcry surrounding Genarlow Wilson’s 
nationally criticized battle with Georgia’s legal system.9  Although initially 
thought to solve the problem of Georgia’s youths being sent to prison for 
terms equal to that of criminals convicted of homicide and other heinous 
crimes, it quickly became evident that the new law would not be applicable 
to Genarlow Wilson, the same man whose case spurred the law’s creation.10  
Even though Wilson’s and Whitaker’s conduct squarely fell within the 
construction of the new amendment, the Georgia legislature chose not to 
apply the ameliorative changes retroactively.11  This meant that both Wilson 
and Whitaker still were subject to the State’s mandatory sex offender 
registry requirement for life even after the legislation was enacted.  
Unfortunately for them, HB 1059’s strict residency requirements brought 
down the hammer on those already required to annually register as a sexual 
offender.12 
The root of the problem stemmed from the fact that the laws Wilson 
and Whitaker were prosecuted under were too overinclusive. In both cases 
the laws drew no distinction between a sexual predator molesting a child 
and two teenagers engaging in consensual sexual activity.  This Note seeks 
to explore the lessons states can learn from Georgia’s treatment of 
Genarlow and Wendy. 
Part II of this Note covers Wilson’s harrowing experience.  Part III 
examines the role of prosecutorial discretion and its effects on Wilson’s 
case. Part IV of this Note examines the Romeo and Juliet laws in Georgia, 
comparing them to similar provisions in Florida. Part V argues that 
                                                                                                     
http://www.sorrb.org/images/hb1059.pdf (adopting exceptions which lessened punishment 
for those specifically delineated by the statute). 
 9. See The Georgia Success Story: Georgia Passes ‘Romeo and Juliet’ Law to 
Protect Youth from Disproportionate Sentencing for Sex Offenses [hereinafter Georgia 
Success Story], CAMPAIGNFORYOUTHJUSTICE.ORG, http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/ 
documents/GA_HB_1059.pdf (last updated Mar. 2011) (praising the Georgia law as a 
“necessary first step to remedy the problem of disproportionate sentencing for juvenile sex 
offenders”). 
 10. See S. David Mitchell, In with the New, Out with the Old: Expanding the Scope of 
Retroactive Amelioration, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4–5 (2009) (explaining the Georgia 
legislature’s decision not to apply the ameliorative effects of the amendment retroactively).  
 11. See H.B. 1059, supra note 8.  
 12. See Geraghty supra note 1, at 515 (noting that although Georgia’s original sex 
offender residency law—banning offenders from living within “1000 feet of a school, child 
care facility, park, recreation facility”— made it difficult to find a place to live, it was 
nonetheless more manageable than the law approved in 2006). 
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ambiguities exist amongst the sexual offense statutes in Georgia. Part VI 
discusses the negative effects of states allowing their legislatures to pass 
ameliorative laws that are prohibited from being used retroactively. Part VII 
discusses how recent legislation passed in 2010 changed the legal landscape 
for people in situations like Wilson and Whitaker.  Finally, Part VIII 
presents an analysis of the current sexual offender laws in Georgia and 
Florida and suggests recommendations to better address the issues that 
arose in both the Wilson and Whitaker cases. 
II.  Genarlow Wilson 
On New Year’s Eve, 2003, seventeen year-old high school student 
Genarlow Wilson was filmed having consensual sex with a seventeen year-
old girl and receiving consensual oral sex from a fifteen year-old girl in a 
motel room.13  The following morning the seventeen year-old girl told 
police she had been raped, and they subsequently searched the motel room 
finding the video camera with the tape of both sexual relations.14  Later, 
Wilson was charged and pled not guilty to charges of rape and aggravated 
child molestation.15  Thinking the rape was the more egregious of the two 
charges, a jury acquitted Wilson of the rape, but found him guilty of the 
aggravated child molestation.16  Unbeknownst to the jury, however, this 
conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years without the 
possibility of parole.17  Upon his eventual release from jail, Wilson would 
be subject to a lifetime registration requirement as a convicted sex 
offender.18 
Wilson’s case caused a national uproar, mostly due to the fact that, 
under the statutory scheme in place at the time, “had Wilson engaged in 
sexual intercourse with [the] fifteen year-old . . .  rather than oral sex,” he 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Wendy S. Cash, A Search For “Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation” in Wilson 
v. State, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 225, 227 (2007) (providing a detailed account of Genarlow 
Wilson’s journey through the Georgia court system). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 228 (citing Brief of Appellant at 2, Wilson, 631 S.E. 2d 391 (Ga. Nov. 14, 
2005) (No. S06A0292)). 
 16. Id. at 228 (discussing Wilson’s acquittal on the charge of rape of Morgan, and his 
conviction of aggravated child molestation for receiving oral sex from Cannon). 
 17. Id. at 238–239 (noting the jury forewoman stating that Wilson was guilty under the 
letter of the law, but not under the spirit of the law). 
 18. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–12 (2012) (requiring lifetime registration for 
individuals found guilty of aggravated child molestation). 
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would have been guilty only of a misdemeanor rather than aggravated child 
molestation—a felony.19  The extreme nature of the mandatory sentence 
elicited a cry for change, especially in light of the fact that as the state law 
stood, this could have been interpreted as an “arbitrary assignment of 
‘drastically different sentences for similar conduct.’”20  
Negative publicity surrounding the case led Georgia lawmakers “to 
close [the] loophole that led to the ten-year term, but they declined to apply 
the new law retroactively.”21  Because of Genarlow Wilson’s case, “the 
Georgia General Assembly, the state’s legislature, closed the loophole in 
2006 to define most offenses involving consensual sex acts between 
teenagers as nothing more than misdemeanors.”22  The loophole closing 
took place while Wilson’s appeal was pending, and the legislature adopted 
a “Romeo and Juliet provision in the aggravated child molestation statute to 
reflect what the legislature, and society, viewed as the proper degree of 
culpability for such adolescent conduct.”23  This provision, much like the 
one for sexual intercourse between teenagers, allowed minors to be charged 
with a misdemeanor rather than a felony.24  However, the legislature 
decided to allow the amendment to pass only as a prospective measure, and 
not a retroactively ameliorative one.25  This decision meant that Wilson 
would have to serve his entire ten-year sentence in jail. 
Nonetheless, after more than two years in jail, well beyond the amount 
of time usually given those charged with similar offenses, Wilson did 
eventually gain his freedom.26  The Georgia Supreme Court held that the 
mandatory minimum ten-year sentence for aggravated child molestation 
was “cruel and unusual punishment in light of the magnitude of the change 
in the penalty in the 2006 Amendment.”27 
                                                                                                     
 19. Cash, supra note 13, at 229. 
 20. Id. (noting this incongruity in the law as the basis of Wilson’s appeal of his 
conviction on both state and federal constitutional grounds). 
 21. Brenda Goodman, Day of Split Outcomes in Teenage Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 
12, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/us/12consent.html?ref=genarl 
owwilson&_r=1& (reporting that on the day of Wilson’s court-ordered release, the attorney 
general indicated that he would appeal the decision to the Georgia Supreme Court). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 4.  
 24. See Georgia Success Story, supra note 9 (explaining the impact of House Bill 
1059 on juvenile offenders).  
 25. See Goodman, supra note 21 (explaining the legislature did not allow the bill to 
apply retroactively). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 5 (explaining that although Wilson’s conduct fell 
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III.  Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Wilson’s Case 
Though the law did not work in Wilson’s favor, prosecutorial 
discretion played a major role in the outcome of his conviction.  
Prosecutors function as the most powerful officials in the criminal justice 
system.28  Prosecutors possess “vast, almost limitless, discretion” protected 
by the Supreme Court, and the Court has shielded them from meaningful 
scrutiny.29  Because most of their decisions are made behind closed doors, 
there is rarely a chance to see any abuse or misconduct stemming from 
prosecutorial discretion.30  On the rare occasions that prosecutorial 
misconduct is challenged in court, often “the alleged misconduct [is] ruled 
harmless error or not addressed by appellate judges. . . . In hundreds of 
additional cases, judges believed that the prosecutorial behavior was 
inappropriate, but affirmed the convictions under the ‘harmless error’ 
doctrine.”31  The real question is whether or not the prosecutors’ behavior in 
Genarlow Wilson’s case amounted to misconduct and abuse of discretion. 
Looking closely at both prosecutors’ actions in this case, an argument 
can be made that “at a minimum, [they] abused their discretion, yet their 
actions were probably well within the bounds of the legal exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion as defined by the United States Supreme Court.”32  
Because Wilson refused to accept a plea offer of a five-year prison sentence 
and mandatory sex offender registration, District Attorney, David McDade 
took Wilson to trial.33 After Wilson’s conviction, the mother of the fifteen 
year-old girl described that she had received what could be perceived as a 
threat from the District Attorney, stating that he told her that she could 
“face legal trouble for ‘neglect’ as a parent if she did not participate in the 
                                                                                                     
within the scope of the 2006 Amendment, the legislature refused to apply it retroactively to 
Wilson or anyone else). 
 28. See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical 
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2007) (discussing “the legal profession’s 
failure to hold prosecutors accountable for misconduct and other ethical violations”).  For a 
more detailed discussion on the pervasiveness of prosecutorial misconduct, see the article in 
its entirety. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 278 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (holding that a 
few constitutional errors that do not have significant bearing or harm do not require an 
automatic reversal of conviction)). 
 32. Id. at 276. 
 33. Id. at 303. 
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prosecution.”34  So, the mother testified identifying her daughter as the girl 
who initiated the consensual oral sex even though her daughter “did not 
want any of this to happen,” lending weight to the idea that the victim did 
not necessarily willingly participate in the prosecution.35 The jury acquitted 
Wilson of statutory rape, but found him guilty of aggravated child 
molestation without knowing that the penalty for the offense was a 
mandatory ten years in prison with no possibility of parole.36 
At the time of Wilson’s habeas case, Georgia’s Attorney General 
Thurbert E. Baker, wrote an open letter to the public explaining his view on 
his role in the case.37 He said: 
The legal issues in the case are straightforward: (1) Is Genarlow 
Wilson's sentence of ten years to serve with one year on probation for 
aggravated child molestation, lawfully imposed when the law of Georgia 
required a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years, cruel and unusual 
punishment under the United States and Georgia Constitutions, and (2) 
can a habeas corpus judge legally resentence Wilson when Georgia law 
does not give him the authority to do so and requires instead returning to 
the trial court?38 
On their face, the legal issues are straightforward; however, Baker 
ignored the significant amount of prosecutorial discretion available to him 
in the habeas case and to the District Attorney who charged Wilson with 
aggravated child molestation.  Neither prosecutor was required to consult 
with the victim,39 but the American Bar Association Standards for the 
Prosecution Function enumerates “the interest of the victim in prosecution 
as an important factor to consider when making [charging decisions].”40  It 
is safe to say that with the wide latitude prosecutors are given in making 
                                                                                                     
 34. Id. at 304. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 303–304 (citing Wright Thompson, Outrageous Injustice, ESPN E-Ticket 
Magazine, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=Wilson (“When the jurors 
found out there was a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence, several were 
incensed . . . . The prosecution told them to write a letter, then moved on to the next case.”)). 
 37. Press Advisory, Open Letter from Thurbert E. Baker, Att’y General, Dept. of Law 
State of Ga., on Genarlow Wilson Case (June 15, 2007) [hereinafter Press Advisory], 
available at http://law.ga.gov/press-releases/2007-06-15/open-letter-attorney-general-baker-
genarlow-wilson-case (sharing his perspective on the issues raised in the case after appealing 
the habeas decision). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Davis, supra note 28, at 304 (citing Angela J. Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE 
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 123–41(2007)). 
 40. Id. (citing the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function 3–3.2(h) (3d ed. 1993)). 
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charging decisions, it is unlikely that a judge would fault the prosecutor for 
taking the victim’s interests into consideration.  Had they done so, perhaps 
the world would never have known Genarlow’s name. 
Former Attorney General Baker also attempted to draw a distinction 
about his role in the Genarlow Wilson case.  Baker wrote that “[b]y law, 
[the Attorney General’s Office] represent[s] the warden, who has the duty 
under state law to defend a habeas corpus case.”41  According to Baker, 
“[h]abeas corpus is a civil proceeding that starts with the presumption that 
the conviction and sentence are valid until and unless the petitioner, in this 
case Genarlow Wilson, proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
constitutional rights have been violated.”42  Baker goes on to summarize 
that because Wilson’s criminal case was over, the Attorney General’s office 
is not the “prosecutor” in a habeas case,43 but merely “counsel” for the 
Corrections warden in a civil proceeding. 
Baker disclaimed all ability not to defend the habeas case, stating that 
the Attorney General simply cannot “start picking and choosing which laws 
to enforce or when to enforce them.”44  The former Attorney General 
outlines his belief that picking and choosing which laws to enforce will lead 
Georgia’s system of government down a “very dangerous path,” threatening 
the system’s foundation.45  Baker wrote that he took an oath “under the 
Georgia Constitution to uphold the laws of the state . . . [and] [a]s long as I 
serve as Attorney General I will fulfill that oath.  Maintaining the rule of 
law demands no less.”46  Baker also suggested that it is not the role of the 
Attorney General to say who gets charged with what crime.47  The Attorney 
General is the head prosecutor for the State of Georgia, and his duties 
                                                                                                     
 41. See Press Advisory, supra note 37 (outlining the process of a habeas corpus 
petition in which the incarcerated is required by law to name his custodian, the Department 
of Corrections warden, as the party respondent). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. (“Should the Attorney General, or any other law enforcement officer, start 
picking and choosing which laws to enforce or when to enforce them, we will be headed 
down a very dangerous path that threatens to undermine the very foundation of our system 
of government.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. (“The state legislature could still retroactively reduce the mandatory ten-
year sentencing requirement, or the Georgia Supreme Court could rule the sentence 
unconstitutionally harsh as applied to Mr. Wilson.  The Attorney General can do neither.”). 
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include “representing the State of Georgia in all civil and criminal cases 
before any court.”48 
While it is true that the prosecutor cannot change the punishment 
requirements, nor render the sentence unconstitutional, the prosecutor most 
certainly has the discretion to decide which charges to bring against the 
accused.49 The Attorney General and the District Attorney possessed 
prosecutorial discretion that allowed them to charge Wilson in the first 
place. 
By allowing Genarlow Wilson to be prosecuted for aggravated child 
molestation, both District Attorney McDade and then Attorney General 
Baker fulfilled the duties they believed came with the oath.  Even though 
their actions in prosecuting Wilson were contrary to the legislative intent of 
the statute, knowing he would receive a mandatory minimum sentence of 
ten years, neither attorney violated any laws or ethical rules.50  Critics of the 
failure to punish unethical prosecutors suggest that an ethical rule be 
enacted forbidding “prosecutors from bringing or pursuing charges that 
contradict . . . legislative intent.”51  Unfortunately, the threat received by the 
witness’s mother was never addressed and the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct lacks an ethical rule that would hold prosecutors accountable for 
abuses of discretion such as those in the Wilson case. 
IV.  Romeo and Juliet Laws 
States across the nation have enacted “Romeo and Juliet” laws to 
address the negative legal effects of consensual sexual relations between 
teenagers.  These laws are designed to protect young sex offenders 
relatively close in age to their “victims” from mandatory sex offender 
registration, given the activity was consensual.52  Different states employ 
different measures, including “motion[s] or [a] petition process for 
registration relief, . . . age-gap provisions, . . . [and even legalizing] sexual 
                                                                                                     
 48. See OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. OF GA., ABOUT THE OFFICE: DUTIES (2013), available at 
http://law.ga.gov/duties (explaining the duty of the office of attorney general). 
 49. See Davis, supra note 28, at 275 (explaining the prosecution’s discretion regarding 
which crimes to charge an individual with). 
 50. Id. at 305. 
 51. Id. at 306. 
 52. See Committee on Criminal Justice, “Issue Brief 2012–214 Examine Florida’s 
‘Romeo and Juliet Law,’” The Florida Senate, 1–5, 2 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter Issue Brief 
2012–214] (explaining the effects and changes on Section § 943.04354 of the Florida 
Senate’s legislation with the state’s enactment of their “Romeo and Juliet” law). 
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conduct between minors and/or those close in age to avoid not only the 
registration requirement but the criminal charge previously associated with 
the sexual conduct.”53 
A.  Florida 
Florida created a petition mechanism allowing this group of offenders 
to “petition in state court for removal of the registration requirement if they 
meet certain criteria.”54  The statute, Section 943.04354,55 applies to 
situations where the victim is at least 14 years-old, the offender is no more 
than 4 years older than the victim at the time of the offense, and where the 
victim consented to the sexual conduct.56  Prior to the passage of the statute: 
If a 15 year-old and an 18 year-old were engaged in a consensual sexual 
relationship, the 18 year-old was subject to registration as a sexual 
offender and could not petition the court for removal of the requirement 
to register for 20 years after the completion of his or her sentence, or if 
adjudication was withheld, 10 years after being released from all 
sanctions.57 
Qualifying offenses include sexual battery, “lewd or lascivious 
offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than sixteen 
years of age” or sexual performance by a child.58  The legislation does not 
legalize any of these qualifying offenses, meaning “[t]he sexual conduct 
associated with these offenses is still a crime.59  Even though Florida’s age 
consent is 18, Section 943.04354 also provides an age gap provision 
allowing “a [sixteen] or [seventeen] year-old to legally consent to sexual 
conduct with a person 16-23 years of age.”60 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1. 
 55. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354 (West 2010) (outlining the eligibility 
requirements for those who can petition for removal of the requirement to register as a 
sexual offender or predator). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Issue Brief 2012–214, supra note 52, at 2. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 3. 
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B.  Georgia 
Georgia’s “Romeo and Juliet” law takes a different approach to 
addressing the negative legal consequences that follow youth “sexual 
offenders” as a result of a consensual sexual relationship with a minor.61  
Instead of creating a petition mechanism as Florida did, Georgia eliminated 
mandatory minimum sentences for this group of sex offenders by enacting 
age-gap provisions.62 
In 2006, Georgia’s age-gap provision, HB 1059,63 took the “necessary 
first step to remedy the problem of disproportionate sentencing for juvenile 
sex offenders.”64  The legislation, as previously discussed, lessened the 
blow to teenagers engaging in consensual sex acts.65  HB 1059 “create[d] an 
exception to the mandatory minimum sentences for sex offenders in cases 
where the victim is [thirteen] to [fifteen] years old, the offender is 
[eighteen] years old or younger, and the age difference between the two is 
no more than four years.”66  Punishment under Georgia’s “Romeo and 
Juliet” law is now classified as a misdemeanor and no longer carries any 
mandatory minimum sentences.67 
Prior to the bill’s enactment, a teenager engaging in consensual oral 
sex with another teenager could end up in the same predicament as Wendy 
Whitaker.  In 1996, Ms. Whitaker had just turned seventeen years old when 
she was arrested and charged with sodomy for engaging in consensual oral 
sex with another student who was a few weeks short of his sixteenth 
birthday.68  Ms. Whitaker received a sentence of five years probation, 
                                                                                                     
 61. See The Georgia Success Story, supra note 9, and accompanying text (relaxing the 
laws for consensual sexual relations between minors). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See H.B. 1059, 2005–2006 Legis. Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/GA_HB_1059.pdf (amending the 
Official Code of Georgia “to change punishment provisions, registration requirements, and 
residency requirements for sexual offenders”). 
 64. See The Georgia Success Story, supra note 9, and accompanying text (declaring 
HB 1059 as taking a necessary first step to relieving the problem). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (“Under the new law, consensual acts between teenagers meeting the age 
criteria above are now a misdemeanor, to which no mandatory minimum sentences are 
attached.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Press Release, Southern Center for Human Rights, Consensual Sex as a 
Teenager leads to Thanksgiving Day Eviction (Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Press Release], 
available at http://www.schr.org/node/145 (reporting the filing of an injunction to protect 
Ms. Wendy Whitaker from eviction because of her status as a registered sex offender in 
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which also required her to register as a sexual offender.69  Until 2010, Ms. 
Whitaker still was required to “register as a sex offender for life” because 
of the nature of her charge.70  She was also required “to have her picture 
posted on [the] Georgia Bureau of Investigations’ website and comply with 
all sex offender residence restrictions and conditions.71  Basically, she was 
treated “as if she was a predator.”72 But, there was “absolutely no basis in 
fact for that treatment.”73  The restrictions Ms. Whitaker faced included 
prohibitions on her “living within 1,000 feet of schools, child care centers, 
churches, swimming pools, school bus stops and other locations.”74 
It is startling that Whitaker, who was convicted of consensual sexual 
activity with a boy of like age was held to the “exact same residency 
restrictions . . . as adult felons convicted of violent crimes such as rape.”75  
If Ms. Whitaker committed the same act that led to her conviction today, 
she would not be subject to mandatory sex offender registration at all.76  In 
2006, Whitaker was forced from the home she and her husband purchased 
because “its proximity to a child care center violated the law.”77  The 
couple was forced to rent another residence while continuing to pay the 
mortgage on their first home.78  In 2008, twelve years after her conviction, 
Ms. Whitaker was ordered to vacate her home within seventy-two hours 
because it was within 1,000 feet of a church.79  She and her husband had 
returned to the house believing that since they both owned the home, “she 
                                                                                                     
Georgia). 
 69. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, 1, 7, Whitaker v. Perdue 
(filed June 20, 2006) [hereinafter Whitaker Complaint] available at 
http://www.schr.org/files/whitaker_complaint_state_court.pdf (requiring Whitaker to 
register as a sex offender). 
 70. Press Release, supra note 69. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction at 3, 
Note 4, Whitaker v. Whittle (2008), available at http://www.schr.org/files/whitaker 
_tro_state_court.pdf. 
 75. Whitaker Complaint, supra note 69, at 27.  
 76. See Press Release, supra note 68 (ameliorating the laws for consensual sexual 
activity but declining to apply the law retroactively). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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had a right to reside there pursuant to [a] Georgia Supreme Court 
decision.”80 
Unfortunately for those convicted of such crimes prior to the 
enactment of House Bill 1059, the legislation specifically provided under 
Section 30 that this provision of the Act would not apply retroactively.81  
Genarlow Wilson’s release from jail was only made possible due to the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s finding that the ten-year mandatory sentence he 
was serving was unconstitutional, as it was cruel and unusual punishment.82  
Wilson’s conviction, however, was not reversed.83  Ms. Whitaker 
eventually was released from her obligation to annually register as a sex 
offender after a judge found “by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. 
Whitaker does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any future 
dangerous sexual offense.”84 
                                                                                                     
 80. See Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., 653 S.E.2d 740 (2007) (concluding that a 
Georgia residency restriction was an impermissible taking without adequate compensation as 
applied to a sex offender who was forced to move out of their home after a child care center 
opened a facility within restricted zone). 
 81. See H.B. 1059 §§ 30(b)–(c), 2005–2006 Legis. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (prohibiting the 
retroactive application of HB 1059 to anyone already required to register on the state sex 
offender registry).  Sections 30(b)–(c) read: 
§ 30(b) Any person required to register pursuant to the provisions of Code 
Section 42–1–12 relating to the state sexual offender registry, and any person 
required not to reside within areas where minors congregate as prohibited by 
Code Section 42–1–13, shall not be relieved of the obligation to comply with the 
provisions of said Code sections by the repeal and reenactment of said Code 
sections. 
§ 30(c) The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime 
of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act 
repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the 
prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal and reenactment, 
or amendment. 
 82. See Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d. 501, 510 (2007) (holding that Wilson’s 
punishment was cruel and unusual punishment, and thus unconstitutional). 
 83. See id. (“[b]ecause . . . the present case stems from Wilson’s habeas petition, we 
cannot direct the trial court to set aside the judgment and to dismiss the proceedings against 
Wilson.  Instead, the corresponding and appropriate habeas relief would be for the habeas 
court to set aside Wilson’s sentence and to discharge Wilson from custody.”). 
 84. See Southern Center for Human Rights, Woman Who Had Consensual Sex as a 
Teenager No Longer Required to Register as a Sex Offender (Sept. 17, 2010),  
http://www.schr.org/action/resources/woman_who_had_consensual_sex_as_a_teenager_no_
longer_required_to_register_as_a_sex_ (reporting that Wendy Whitaker’s case highlights 
problems with Georgia’s Sex Offender Registry); see also Part VII for a more in depth 
discussion about the legislative change allowing Whitaker to be released from her 
registration obligation. 
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V.  Ambiguity Amongst the Sexual Offense Statutes in Georgia 
Why so much ambiguity amongst the statutes? Carolyn Cocca argues 
in her article 16 Will Get You 20: Adolescent Sexuality and Statutory Rape 
Laws,85 that statutory rape laws in practice are a “double-edged sword.”86  
Cocca points out that statutory rape laws “can punish someone who has 
taken advantage of or harmed an underage person or perhaps deter people 
from engaging in potentially coercive, unequal, manipulative, or predatory 
relationships.”87  But they can also punish consensual sexual activity simply 
because one of the parties is under the legal age of consent.88  The same is 
true for other sexual offense laws; they too function as a double-edged 
sword.  Section 16–6–4 of the Code of Georgia,89 for example, punishes 
persons who commit the offense of aggravated child molestation. Under § 
16–6–4(c), “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated child molestation 
when such person commits an offense of child molestation which act 
physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy.”90 
At face value, it is evident that this statute is attempting to deter people 
from engaging in coercive or predatory relationships as well as punishing 
those who take advantage of or harm underage persons.  However, the 
statute’s exception to the usual life imprisonment or split sentence that is a 
term of imprisonment not less than twenty-five years, punishes sexual 
activity between minors simply because one of the parties is under the legal 
age of consent.91  The exception reads: 
§ 16–6–4(d)(2) A person convicted of the offense of aggravated child 
molestation when: (A) The victim is at least thirteen but less than 
                                                                                                     
 85. Carolyn Cocca, “16 Will Get You 20”: Adolescent Sexuality and Statutory Rape 
Laws, in ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY: A HISTORICAL HANDBOOK AND GUIDE 15–29 (Carolyn 
Cocca ed., 2006) (studying the criminalization of sexual activity with an unmarried person 
who is under the age of consent, thus violating statutory rape laws). 
 86. Id. at 15. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
 89. GA. CODE ANN. § 16–6–4 (2012). 
 90. GA. CODE ANN. § 16–6–4(c) (2012). 
 91. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16–6–4(d)(1) (2012). The statute provision reads: 
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person convicted of 
the offense of aggravated child molestation shall be punished by 
imprisonment for life or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment 
for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by 
probation for life, and shall be subject to the sentencing and punishment 
provisions of Code Sections 17–10–6.1 and 17–10–7. 
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sixteen years of age; (B) The person convicted of aggravated child 
molestation is eighteen years of age or younger and is no more than four 
years older than the victim; and (C) The basis of the charge of 
aggravated child molestation involves an act of sodomy shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor and shall not be subject to the sentencing and 
punishment provisions of Code Section 17–10–6.1.92  
The punishment for those who fit within this age-gap provision is 
much less harsh than for those who do not fit within it, but the statute 
nonetheless still punishes sexual activity that falls under the category of 
sodomy solely because at least one of the parties is under the legal age of 
consent. 
Cocca also notes that in the case of statutory rape laws, “concentrating 
resources on cases in which one of the parties is in a supervisory 
relationship, or in which the parties are far apart in age leaves young people 
closer in age, or whose ages fall within the span, unprotected.”93  Cocca’s 
argument about the vulnerability of young people close in age or whose 
ages fall within the age-gap is applicable to statutes concerning sexual 
offenses other than rape.  Again, looking at Georgia’s Code § 16–6–4(d)(2), 
that section creates an exception from harsh punishment for teenagers who 
fall within the age gap by converting their offenses to misdemeanors rather 
than felonies.94  Nowhere in the statute is consensuality mentioned.  The 
absence of consensuality in the statute leads one to believe that the 
legislature took a leap slightly too far in its enactment of the “Romeo and 
Juliet” law.  Here, the legislature fell into the trap Cocca warned of in her 
study of statutory rape provisions—the legislature enacted a provision that 
is overinclusive. The provision attempts to correct the shortcomings of prior 
legislation by lessening the punishment a young offender receives, but fails 
to protect those young victims who may be coerced into the sexual activity.  
By omitting a requirement that the sexual activity (sodomy in this 
provision) be consensual in the exception, the legislature left the door wide 
open for young offenders who coerced their young victims to escape felony 
convictions.  As written, § 16-6-4(d)(2) does not provide a way for young 
victims to prosecute their young offenders so long as the offense meets the 
enumerated requirements under the statute. 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. 
 93. COCCA, supra note 5 (discussing how age-span provisions in statutory rape laws 
fail to punish instances of forcible rape among teenagers close in age). 
 94. See § 16-6-4(d)(2).  
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VI.  The 2006 Amendment Does Not Retroactively Apply to Either Wilson 
or Whitaker 
As previously mentioned, the 2006 Romeo and Juliet laws enacted by 
Georgia’s legislature were not retroactively applicable to Wilson, Whitaker 
or anyone else in a similar situation.  S. David Mitchell’s article, In with the 
New, Out with the Old: Expanding the Scope of Retroactive Amelioration, 
questions why state legislatures are allowed to pass proscriptive–only 
legislation.95 This section summarizes Mitchell’s main points about 
Wilson’s extended punishment in the face of legislation that could have set 
him free much earlier. 
A.  What Is An Ameliorative Retroactively Applying Statute? 
Taken at face value, the decision to deny retroactive application of the 
law enacted on July 1, 2006 appears to be an abuse of legislative discretion 
or contrary to the Constitution.96  However, Mitchell argues that it is neither 
under current law.97  In fact, Mitchell argues, decisions not to apply 
ameliorative changes retroactively, “are in accord with the principles 
governing statutory retroactivity.”98  According to Sutherland Statutes and 
Statutory Construction, “[r]etrospective operation is not favored by courts, 
and a law is not construed as retroactive unless the act clearly, by express 
language or necessary implication, indicates that the legislature intended a 
retroactive application.”99  In House Bill 1059, Georgia’s legislature 
included an express provision indicating proscriptive application only: 
H.B. 1059 § 30(b) Any person required to register . . . to the state sexual 
offender registry, and any person required not to reside within areas 
where minors congregate . . . shall not be relieved of the obligation to 
comply with the [prior] provisions . . . by the repeal and reenactment of 
[the prior provisions]. 
H.B. 1059 § 30(c) The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the 
status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the 
effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Mitchell, supra note 10, at 5 (explaining that “statutes are presumed, 
generally, to operate proscriptively only”). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41:4  (7th ed. 2009). 
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amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated 
as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.100 
This clause, known as an “express saving clause,” prohibited the new 
legislation from being used by people in situations similar to both Wendy 
Whitaker and Genarlow Wilson.  An express saving clause prohibits “the 
termination of previously commenced prosecutions” and “retain[s] the 
punishment in the original statute, particularly following a statutory 
amendment in which the penalty is increased and thus constitutionally 
barred.”101  Mitchell asserts that over time, the saving clause has been used 
to the contrary; now retaining the original penalty even when the legislative 
change decreased said penalty.102  This relatively new use does not result in 
a constitutional bar, but rather in a group of defendants serving sentences 
they would not have to serve under the new law. Georgia could have easily 
applied ameliorative changes to Wilson and Whitaker.  Ameliorative 
change is a circumstance where statutory retroactivity is permissible.103 
Absent the saving clause, the Georgia courts could have relied upon the 
ameliorative changes to the aggravated child molestation provisions to 
rebut the presumption against statutory retroactivity.104  However, due to 
the express saving clause in the amendment, the courts were prevented from 
applying the new law retroactively.105 
B.  Reasons Some States Practice Judicial or Legislative Retroactive 
Amelioration 
A number of state courts practice judicial or legislative retroactive 
amelioration.106  States that use judicial retroactive amelioration have many 
justifications for their decisions to apply ameliorative legislation 
retroactively despite the existence of savings statutes that otherwise prohibit 
                                                                                                     
 100. H.B. 1059 § 30(b)–(c), 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (prohibiting the 
retroactive application of HB 1059 to anyone already required to register on the state sex 
offender registry) (emphasis added). 
 101. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 7. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 5 (noting that there are three circumstances where statutory retroactivity 
may be justified: (1) legislative intent expressly or impliedly indicates retroactivity is 
desirable; (2) where the statute is ameliorative or curative in nature; or (3) where the parties’ 
reasonable expectations require retroactive application (citing SINGER, supra note 100)). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 8. 
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such judicial action.107  One reason is the belief that the “denial of 
retroactive amelioration is contrary to theories of punishment.”108  Another 
reason is that some courts rely on rules of statutory construction to permit 
retroactive application, or  “find the language of the general saving statute 
to be ambiguous, thus giving the court license to not adhere to it.”109  Other 
courts believe that the saving clause is to be used only to prevent an 
application of the abatement doctrine, and thus should not be used to 
prohibit retroactive amelioration.110  Under the common law doctrine of 
abatement, when a legislative repeal, repeal and reenactment, or 
amendment of a statute takes place, all pending prosecutions are terminated 
“unless the legislature expresses a contrary intent by the insertion of an 
express saving clause in the new or amended statute in the absence of an 
express contrary legislative intent.”111  The express language of HB 1059’s 
saving clause makes it evident that it was specifically designed to prevent 
the termination of all pending prosecutions. 
C.  Retroactive Amelioration at the Federal Level 
Although federal courts may not acknowledge their participation in 
retroactive amelioration, their actions—such as recognizing exceptions to 
the federal general saving statute—suggest otherwise.112  The first 
exception relies on federal court decisions holding that “allowing the 
federal general savings clause to prevent the [constitutional] amendment’s 
application would improperly elevate legislation authority over the 
expressed will of the people . . . particularly when formerly proscribed 
conduct has been decriminalized.”113 Georgia’s courts elevated their 
legislative authority by refusing to recognize that a retroactive application 
of HB 1059 would be consistent with the will of the people.  HB 1059 was 
created mostly in reaction to the public outcry against Wilson’s ten-year 
                                                                                                     
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. See Mitchell, supra note 10; see also PART V. A. for a full argument regarding 
denial of retroactive amelioration as contrary to theories of punishment. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 25 (noting the criticism of the common law abatement doctrine shared by 
jurists and scholars alike). 
 112. See id. at 8. 
 113. Id. (noting that the Supreme Court has ignored the federal saving statute and 
allowed retroactive application of constitutional amendments (citing Holiday v. United 
States, 683 A.2d 61, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1996))). 
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prison term.114  Because the court refused to allow an exception to the 
saving clause, the bill intended to save Wilson did everything but that. 
The same went for Wendy Whitaker.  The Southern Center for Human 
Rights named her the first plaintiff in its federal lawsuit against the State of 
Georgia, enjoining the state from removing Whitaker and others like her 
from their homes.115  The “people’s will” clearly recognized that the 
sodomy statutes at the time of Whitaker’s arrest were enacted to keep 
predators from engaging in sexual activities with young teenagers—not for 
school-aged experimentation between peers. 
D.  A Proposed Retroactive Amelioration Statute 
Mitchell proposes enacting a retroactive amelioration statute that 
would “broaden the scope of amelioration beyond pre-final judgment 
defendants to include . . . post-final judgment defendants,”116 and be 
“consistent with the theories [and goals] of punishment” by adopting an 
approach of “attaching an ameliorative amendment exception to a general 
saving provision.”117  His proposed statute would allow post-final judgment 
defendants to “request either an expedited parole review or an 
administrative sentencing hearing following an ameliorative legislative 
change.”118 
Under the proposed statute, post-final judgment defendants will be 
able to ask permission to be released from their duty to register.119  
However, in cases other than sex offender registry, defendants will be able 
to request an early parole review so that they will not have to serve 
sentences deemed longer than what they ought to be upon passage of an 
ameliorative change.  Mitchell’s proposed statute also features an exception 
in its general saving clause.120  The proposed statute would give automatic 
effect to any retroactive amelioration and prevent abatement from being 
triggered, “thereby negating the necessity of the express saving clause.”121  
                                                                                                     
 114. See Georgia Success Story, supra note 9. 
 115. See Southern Center for Human Rights, supra note 85 (reporting the filing of an 
injunction to protect Ms. Wendy Whitaker from eviction because of her status as a registered 
sex offender in Georgia). 
 116. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 7. 
 117. Id. at 7–9. 
 118. Id. at 9. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 10. 
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So, for example, when HB 1059 was enacted on July 1, 2006, both 
Genarlow Wilson and Wendy Whitaker would have been eligible for an 
expedited parole review.  Since the charges for both parties were reduced 
from felonies to misdemeanors, it is likely that Genarlow would have been 
released from prison much earlier because his original sentence would be 
much longer than the new required sentence. 
It is even more likely that Wendy Whitaker would not have spent an 
extra four years on the sex offender registry, banned from living in a home 
she paid a mortgage on while renting properties more suitable for a sex 
offender. Fortunately for Wendy Whitaker, in 2010, Georgia recognized the 
benefits of permitting expedited parole review 122 and created a provision 
for those offenders who are not dangerous sexual predators.123 
VII.  How Does the 2010 Legislation Change the Legal Landscape for 
Young Sexual Offenders? 
Although the legislature carved out age-gap provisions, exempting 
many would-be sex offender registrants, the 2006 legislation was 
specifically kept from being applied retroactively to Georgians such as 
Wendy Whitaker and Genarlow Wilson.  Both could have benefitted 
immediately from the legislation.  Wendy would have been able to move 
back into her home.  Genarlow would have been released having served the 
requisite time in prison under the new law.  Nonetheless, Wilson remained 
imprisoned until his punishment was overturned as cruel and unusual.124  
Whitaker continued to be barred from living in her own home. 
Interestingly enough, in 2008, Whitaker attempted to move back into 
the home she and her husband purchased.  The couple made the move after 
the Georgia Supreme Court handed down their ruling in Mann v. Georgia 
Department of Corrections.125  In that case, the Court ruled that Anthony 
                                                                                                     
 122. See id. at 9 (“[N]o longer is the timing of an ameliorative legislative change 
determinative of who is to be eligible for such changes. Not only do benefits inure to post-
final judgment defendants with a sentence reduction, but also society benefits in the 
reduction of incarceration costs.”). 
 123. GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–19(a)(2) (West 2012) (“An individual required to register 
pursuant to Code § 42–1–12 may petition . . . for release from registration requirements and 
from any residency or employment restrictions . . . if the individual . . . (2) [w]as sentenced 
for a crime that became punishable as a misdemeanor on or after July 1, 2006 . . . .”). See 
supra Part III. 
 124. See Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d. 501, 511 (2007) (stating that the appropriate 
relief would be for the habeas court to set aside Wilson’s sentence and discharge Wilson). 
 125. 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007) (holding that a Georgia residency statute permitted 
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Mann was required to register as a sex offender in Georgia after pleading 
no contest to “taking indecent liberties with a child” in North Carolina.126  
Mann was charged with exposing himself to two minors in 2002.127  In 
2003, Mann bought a home that fit within the residency restrictions—it was 
not within 1,000 feet of any child care, church, school, or area where 
minors congregated.128  When a child care facility moved within 1,000 feet 
of Mann’s home, his probation officer “demanded that [Mann] remove 
himself from his home upon penalty of arrest and revocation of 
probation.”129  Mann filed suit against the State of Georgia citing the fact 
that the residency restriction under the Georgia Code § 42-1-15 had no 
“‘move-to-the-offender’ exception to its provisions” leaving him with no 
option but to move.130 
Like Whitaker, Mann could not “legally reside in his home 
until . . . released from the registration requirement by a Superior Court, 
which cannot occur until a minimum period of ten years has passed after his 
release from probation. . . . Assuming another residence can be located, he 
is faced with financial burden of both . . . residences.”131  Surprisingly, even 
though Mann exposed himself to minors under the age of sixteen,132 he was 
granted an exception to the rule while Wendy Whitaker was not. 
However, in 2010, the Georgia legislature amended the state code, 
adding § 42–1–19(a)(2).133  This provision now allows individuals who are 
required to register for the sex offender registry to petition “for release from 
registration requirements and from any residency or employment 
restrictions . . . if the individual . . . [w]as sentenced for a crime that became 
punishable as a misdemeanor on or after July 1, 2006.”134  The provision 
                                                                                                     
“impermissible taking without adequate compensation as applied to sex offender who was 
forced to move out of home after child care center opened facility within restricted zone”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Ga. Supreme Court hears challenge to sex offender law, ACCESS NORTH 
GEORGIA (undated) (discussing Mann’s challenge to Georgia’s residency restrictions). 
 128. See Mann, 653 S.E.2d at 742 (finding it uncontroverted that Mann’s home and 
business were not within 1,000 feet of a childcare facility). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Mann v. Georgia Dep’t of Corrs., 653 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 2007). 
 132. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14–202.1(a)(1) (West 1994) (“A person is guilty of taking 
indecent liberties with children [if] . . . he either . . . takes of attempts to take any immoral, 
improper, or indecent liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the 
purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.”).  
 133. GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–19(a)(2) (2010). 
 134. Id. 
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expanded the pool of convicted sex offenders eligible to have the 
ameliorative sentencing change applied.  As David Mitchell’s proposed 
retroactive amelioration statute suggests, the timing of an ameliorative 
measure no longer depends on its timing.135  In Whitaker’s case, Wendy 
immediately inured the benefits of the ameliorative change once the 
provision was enacted with an immediate release from the sex offender 
registry fourteen years after her conviction.  It was found “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Whitaker does not pose a 
substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous offense.”136  No longer 
did she have to pay a mortgage on one home while paying rent in another.  
Wendy could rest easy knowing that a police officer would no longer knock 
on her door telling her that she had seventy-two hours to vacate her home 
because it is too close to a church.  With her release from the registry, local 
law enforcement no longer had to police her and others like her.  No longer 
did taxpayer money go towards evicting the Wendy Whitakers of Georgia 
from their homes for non-dangerous sexual activity that occurred while a 
minor. 
So what does the legislation mean for the Genarlow Wilsons of the 
world?  Genarlow’s main concern in not taking the plea offered to him was 
that he would have to register as a sex offender.137  Had he done so, upon 
his release he would have been prohibited from living at home with his 
mother because he had a younger, minor sister in the home.138  His concerns 
about registering as a sex offender were real. 
Before his release from prison Wilson often wondered what life would 
be like as a registered sex offender.139  Wilson and his family would have 
been subjected to the full impact of the “collateral consequences” often 
overlooked by legislators when signing bills like HB1059 into law.140  He 
                                                                                                     
 135. Mitchell, supra note 6, at 9. 
 136. See Press Release, Southern Center for Human Rights, Woman Who Had 
Consensual Sex as a Teenager No Longer Required to Register as a Sex Offender (Sept. 17, 
2010), available at http://www.schr.org/action/resources/woman_who_had_consensual_ 
sex_as_a_teenager_no_longer_required_to_register_as_a_sex_ (commenting on the 2010 
changes to Georgia’s laws that created “a practical process for certain individuals to apply to 
be released from the registry”). 
 137. See Brenda Goodman, Day of Split Outcomes in Teenage Sex Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/us/12consent.html? 
ref=genarlowwilson&_r=1& (noting that Wilson refused to take a standing plea deal that 
would have reduced his sentence, but required him to register as a sex offender). 
 138. Cash, supra note 13, at 245. 
 139. Id. at 245. 
 140. See Tewksbury, supra note 7 (providing an overview of the impact residency 
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correctly guessed that as a registered sex offender he would not be able to 
obtain a job because “nobody will want to hire [some]one who [has been] 
convicted of molestation.”141  His dreams of going to college were 
dashed.142  His words sound almost despondent as he ponders the thought of 
never having his own children, saying, “I won’t be able to do 
anything . . . you can’t be around kids so that basically [means] you can’t 
have any of your own.  That . . . really hurt[s].”143  Continuing he said, “I 
can’t live with that label, you know, that’s a life sentence by itself, being 
labeled a child molester.”144  Perhaps most jarring is the thought that he 
would forever be associated with people he had nothing in common with. 
You know, they can get a picture of me, put it on the internet, put it on 
the nearest telephone pole. . . . It’s not a great feeling 
being . . . classified as a sex offender.  I don’t feel like I . . . fit into that 
category.  Nothing I’ve done can classify me with those people.145 
Wilson’s fears were dead on.  At the time of his trial, had Wilson taken 
the plea deal, he would have been subjected to the same horrors of Wendy 
Whitaker and others in her situation.  When first enacted, HB 1059 made it 
a “felony punishable by ten to thirty years in prison for a registered sex 
offender to reside, be employed, or loiter within 1000 feet of a school; child 
care facility; church; public or private park, recreation facility or 
playground; skating rink; neighborhood center; gymnasium; community 
swimming pool; or school bus stop.”146  This meant that Genarlow Wilson 
would never attend activities at his younger sister’s school, he could not 
walk her to the bus, nor attend church with his family.  It seems near 
impossible that housing meeting all that criteria would be anywhere Wilson 
and his family would want to live.  Data shows that areas dense in 
registered sex offenders have higher unemployment rates, have “fewer 
residents [with] high school or college educations, greater proportions of 
families liv[ing] below the poverty line, fewer residents [who] owned their 
own homes,” and lower household incomes and home values.147 
                                                                                                     
restrictions have on offenders).  
 141. Cash, supra note 13, at 245. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Tewksbury, supra note 7, at 531 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–15 (Supp. 2006)). 
 147. Id. at 535. 
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Now, thanks to State of Georgia Code § 42–1–19(a)(2), permission to 
petition the court for removal from registry status is available to those post-
conviction defendants whose sex offender registry requirement was not 
removed upon release, unlike Wilson’s, and whose charged crimes became 
punishable as a misdemeanor on July 1, 2006.148 
Absent the sex offender charge, Wilson has moved on in life.  In May 
2013, Wilson will graduate with honors from a well-known historically 
black college.149  Touted as one of the success stories supported by a 
famous philanthropist, Wilson began mentoring and offering support to 
Atlanta-area youths while in college.150  Whitaker has also moved on in the 
wake of her release from registry requirements.  After her release from the 
duty to register, her name disappeared from headlines—putting an end to 
her rollercoaster ride and allowing her to fade into the shadows. 
VIII.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The laws that states such as Georgia and Florida have conjured up over 
the last few decades started out extreme, but have since attempted to lessen 
their heavy blows to young lovers over time through enactments of “Romeo 
and Juliet” laws.  However, the legislatures in Georgia and Florida still 
have not completely solved the problems that surfaced during Genarlow 
Wilson’s and Wendy Whitaker’s cases.  As Cocca points out, the question 
remains “how to protect the vulnerable without essentializing all young 
people as victims and how, at the same time, to leave those who are 
choosing to engage in particular activities to their privacy.”151  This section 
highlights the evidence that the current laws are still imperfect—the policy 
rationales behind young sexual offender registration has little effect on 
recidivism rates; harsh sexual offender laws for young people punish 
                                                                                                     
 148. GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–19(a)(2) (2010). 
 149. Jackie Jones, Graduation Delayed for Genarlow Wilson, 
BLACKAMERICAWEB.COM (May 18, 2012), http://blackamericaweb.com/5032/graduation-
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teenagers for normative behavior; and the harsh laws increase the number 
of plea bargains among young sex offenders. 
A.  The Laws Are Still Imperfect 
These laws are still imperfect.  The age-gap provisions used in both 
states still leave many teenaged lovers vulnerable to the heavy 
consequences that accompany a violation of the state’s sexual offender 
laws.  In Florida’s “Romeo and Juliet” exception,152 a person will only be 
considered for removal of the requirement to register on the state’s sexual 
offender registry if the person “is not more than 4 years older than the 
victim of th[e] violation who was 14 years of age or older but not more than 
17 years of age at the time the person committed th[e] violation.”153  While 
the statute appears to be clear on it its face, it is foreseeable that questions 
about calculation of time and ages will certainly come before the courts.  In 
2011, the Florida District Court of Appeals overturned a Circuit Court grant 
for petition of removal, holding that a “defendant, who was four years, 
three months, and eight days older than the victim, was ‘more than’ four 
years older than the victim and, thus, ineligible” for removal from the 
registry requirement.154  The age-gap provision leaves those teenage 
“offenders” who fall just outside the gap’s restrictions subject to the state’s 
harsh penalty of no petition eligibility until twenty years after the 
completion of his or her sentence.155 
B.  The Laws Often Punish Normative Behavior 
Not only is the punishment doled out for these offenses typically cruel 
and unusual, many of the young people convicted under these statutes are 
charged with offenses for normative sexual behavior.156  The U.S. 
Department of Labor’s National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in 2000 
“found that out of the 3,444 respondents (37 percent of the total) who 
reported having had sexual intercourse, more than half reported having 
intercourse by age 14 and more than 80 percent reported sexual intercourse 
                                                                                                     
 152. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354(c) (West 2010) (outlining the eligibility 
requirements for those who can petition for removal of the requirement to register as a 
sexual offender or predator). 
 153. Id. 
 154. State v. Marcel, 67 So. 3d. 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2011). 
 155. See Issue Brief 2012214, supra note 52, at 2. 
 156. Id. 
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by age 15.”157  This research “suggests that sexual behavior that is often 
defined as illegal is common among juveniles; nearly one third of the total 
group surveyed had engaged in sexual intercourse before they were of legal 
age to do so.”158  Based on this information, it seems as though counseling 
may provide the result the legislature hopes to achieve by sending these 
offenders to jail and forcing them to register as a sex offender. 
C.  State Policy Rationale for Sex Offender Registration Has Little Effect on 
Recidivism Rates 
Recently, courts have recognized that requiring young people 
convicted of sex offenses, such as Genarlow Wilson and Wendy Whitaker, 
to serve terms in jail and to register as a sex offender for life is cruel and 
unusual punishment.159  It seems that by allowing young lovers to still be 
prosecuted and imprisoned under state law, legislators in these states have 
taken a stance that they view teenage sex in a negative light.  The states’ 
issues with teenage sex, however, are not best dealt with mandatory sex 
offender registration for youth offenders.160  Out of fourteen studies 
examining policy effects of registration and notification on recidivism, for 
example, ten reported “no significant effects on violent and/or sexual 
recidivism.”161 
D.  Harsh Penalties for Young Sex Offenders Increases the Number of Plea 
Bargains 
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 159. See Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d. 501, 507 (2007) (concluding that the 
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 160. See Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Policy Increases Juvenile Plea Bargains, 25 Sex. Abuse 189, 190 (2013) (finding that “[s]ex 
offender registration and notification policies aim to deter sexual offending [and] reduce 
sexual recidivism . . . . Despite these aims, a growing body of research generally fails to 
support the efficacy of these policies”).  
 161. Id. 
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In Sex Offender Registration and Notification Policy Increases 
Juvenile Plea Bargains,162 Elizabeth Letourneau concludes that the 
registration and notification requirement in South Carolina163 “fails to deter 
new juvenile sex crimes, fails to deter juvenile sexual or violent recidivism, 
and increases the risk that youth will incur new nonsex, nonviolent 
misdemeanor charges.”164  The researchers stress that “[n]either individual 
recidivism risk nor case-specific circumstances are permitted to influence 
registration and notification requirements and there is no mechanism for 
registrants to reduce the duration of requirements from life.”165  Because 
South Carolina’s requirements for young offenders are similar to those in 
Florida and Georgia, the effects of South Carolina’s requirements are no 
less likely to occur in the other two states.166  Letourneau concludes that 
many prosecutors in South Carolina “appear to have altered the manner in 
which they do business.”167  The South Carolina prosecutors do so by 
increasingly dismissing juvenile sex offenses outright or offering plea deals 
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655(B)(2) provided the offender is eighteen years of age or less, or consensual 
sexual conduct between persons under sixteen years of age, the convicted person 
is not an offender and is not required to register pursuant to the provisions of 
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 167. See Letourneau et al., supra note 147, at 203. 
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to nonsex offense charges.168  Though it is unlikely that dismissal of 
charges or amending charges will be detrimental to community safety per 
se, other potential consequences may flow from these outcomes.169  
Letourneau posits that “juveniles who have actually committed offenses but 
whose charges were dismissed of amended to nonsex offense charges might 
not receive appropriate clinical services or supervision.  Moreover, youth 
age and race influenced [prosecutors] decisions to permit plea bargains, 
introducing the possibility of inequity.”170  These potential consequences 
are counterproductive to society’s overall goal of rehabilitating offenders. 
E.  Recommendations 
Critics of legislation surrounding youth sex offender registry 
requirements have presented recommendations aimed at lessening the 
harms committed by the legislation.  For example, Letourneau submits that 
youths charged with sex offenses should be exempt from sex offender 
registration and notification requirements “until such time as empirically 
rigorous evidence emerges indicating that these policies can be crafted in 
such a way as to improve community safety.”171  This overinclusive 
approach would certainly eradicate the harmful effects of mandatory sex 
offender registration on young offenders who do not fit the category of 
“sexually dangerous predator.”172  However, excluding all youth means that 
the actual “sexually dangerous predator” youth offenders will be exempt 
from sex offender registration.  This result is the precise issue legislators 
attempt to address in their catch-all statutes. Exempting all youth sex 
offenders from registration would negate all previous efforts of the 
legislature to make their community aware of predators. 
If enacted, the proposed amelioration statute suggested by S. David 
Mitchell could be the most productive way of achieving the goals of 
remedying the problems presented by the ambiguities present in many 
states’ sex offender statutes. The likelihood of such reform taking place, 
however, seems slight.  The states concerned with the unfair consequences 
of preventing retroactive amelioration already employ a way to get around 
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it, such as Georgia’s amendment allowing for the release of Wendy 
Whitaker from sex offender registry.  States that feel it is up to the 
legislation to determine who laws apply to see a need for the savings clause 
and are unlikely to allow exceptions to it. 
Florida’s legislature took a step in the right direction by enacting 
provisions to serve as a check on their sexual offender registration and 
notification systems.  In 2006, Florida enacted a law requiring a triennial 
study to track the effectiveness of the state’s sexual offender registration 
and notification processes.173  The statute was most likely enacted in 
anticipation of the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006, as a step towards implementing the new federal law.174  To evaluate 
effectiveness, under Florida Statute § 943.04353, Florida’s Office of 
Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability examines the 
practices of Florida’s state agencies, and how they share offender 
information regarding registered sexual offenders “for the purpose of 
fulfilling the requirements set forth in the registration laws.”175 
Other goals hoped to be achieved by the triennial study include 
“ensuring informed decisions are made at each point of the criminal justice 
and registration process”176 and focusing on the provisions’ sufficiency in 
apprising communities of the presence of such offenders.177  The statute 
states that if the report finds deficiencies in the process or in the provisions, 
the report shall recommend options for fixing the deficiencies and include 
projected costs of fixing the deficiencies.178  Though there is no direct 
evidence that the state’s Romeo and Juliet laws were adopted as an 
outgrowth of this legislation, it would be no surprise if they were.  
Implementing studies and reports such as those demanded by Florida 
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Statute § 943.04353 seem likely to increase state legislatures’ ability to 
catch loopholes in their laws that result in consequences like those suffered 
by Genarlow Wilson and Wendy Whitaker.  A regular assessment of sexual 
offender registration and notification systems will allow state legislatures to 
continually tailor their laws to be consistent with the goals of the people. 
Though a regular and consistent assessment of laws could produce 
significant results with regards to making sure the correct people are being 
policed, a balance needs to be struck.  That balance is best struck with case-
by case analysis.  Case-by-case analysis is needed for youth sex offender 
charges.  Case-by-case analysis is likely to slow down court proceedings 
and cause an increase in judicial costs.  Contrasted with the amount of tax-
payer money spent policing one-time offenders unlikely to offend again, it 
is logical to suggest that the cost and burden of determining mandatory 
registration be shifted to the courts. Using the current legislation as 
guidelines for analyzing registry status, rather than as mandatory 
punishment, will help eliminate the overinclusivity of the approach 
highlighted above and the overinclusivity of the current statutes.  More 
importantly, adoption of case-by-case analysis will increase the advocacy of 
the rights that so often get overlooked with these mandatory schemes — the 
victim’s rights. 
